Unintended Consequences of Radical Innovation
Description
The introduction of radical innovation can lead to some socially and economically important, but under-researched consequences. It is important, then, to understand the unintended consequences of innovation. For example, one legacy of the radical innovations of the industrial revolution was the growth of large companies, creating long-term employment for specific regions: leading to less need for entrepreneurial activity, which in turn eroded cultural competencies for innovation. Other consequences are more immediate and even less tangible. These are concerned with internal organisational processes and the way managers and others think about and react to innovations.
Within that broad topic, this seminar is concerned broadly with exploring how consequences (positive/negative) of radical innovations remain unforeseen, how they can be discerned or coped with better, and what can be learnt from them.

Programme for the day is as follows (Please note the venue has jet to be confirmed)...
9.30 - 10.00 Registration & Coffee
10.00 - 10.15 Welcome
10.15 - 11.15 When Innovation Goes Wrong ….
Dr Nick Beesley, SETIS Ltd & Loughborough University
11.15 - 12.15 The Unintended Corollaries of Radical Innovation: Lessons Learned from Industry
Professor Philippe Baumard, Ecole Polytechnique CRG Paris
12.15 - 13.15 Lunch
13.15 - 14.15 Learning From and Anticipating Failure
Professor Gerard Hodgkinson, University of Leeds Professor William Starbuck, University of Oregon
14.15 - 15.15 Cognitive Reactions to Radical Innovation, and Some Suggestions for Doing it Better
Professor William Starbuck, University of Oregon
15.15 – 16.00 Debate/discussion and summary of the day
16.00 Coffee, networking and close
Any queries or to request a registration form please contact Emma Woodward on +44 (0)115 846 6655 or email
This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
Synopses of the presenters...
When Innovation Goes Wrong ….
Dr Nick Beesley, SETIS Ltd & Loughborough University
This presentation will reflect upon the business achievements of the offshore oil and gas industry as it has adjusted from small near shore developments to large offshore cities. These facilities provide the home comforts for operators and technicians which we are all used to whilst they pump the oil and gas ashore to keep the wheels of industry turning. However in some cases these advances come at a high price. Following a brief history into the oil and gas sector, the presentation will investigate what happens when innovation goes wrong and how the industry has sought to make sure that its lessons are learnt by others.
The Unintended Corollaries of Radical Innovation: Lessons Learned from Industry
Professor Philippe Baumard, Ecole Polytechnique CRG Paris
This presentation will focus on case studies of what happened "behind the scene" in radical innovation stories in European companies. Amongst other ideas, the presentation will show that:
radical innovations are usually not very well received by organisations, for cognitive and behavioural reasons;
firms create environments in order to make their innovations seem radical, and do so through careful preparation and ‘spinning’ messages;
that organisations erect façades to deceive other stakeholders, but these façades can be beneficial for innovation;
when radical is radical, it is unexpected.
The presentation will reflect personal experiences working on innovation with various companies.
Learning From and Anticipating Failure
Professor Gerard Hodgkinson, University of Leeds
Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994, Academy of Management Review), introduced the notion of inter-organizational macrocultures to account for the all too frequent failure of entire industries to adapt to radically new competitors and technological innovations, clinging instead to outmoded practices and competitive positioning strategies. In this talk, Gerard Hodgkinson will critically evaluate this notion from a multi-level perspective, reviewing a number of studies that point to the importance of individual, group, organizational, and inter-organisational processes that variously enable firms, both individually and collectively, to anticipate and learn from failure or conversely, inhibit such learning and stifle innovation. In conclusion I will consider the implications of my analysis for the design of scenario planning interventions for helping to achieve breakthrough thinking.
Cognitive Reactions to Radical Innovation, and Some Suggestions for Doing it Better
Professor William Starbuck, University of Oregon
Several biases affect perceptions of radical innovations. In organisations, people talk upward and listen upward, which creates significant differences in perceptions at the tops and bottoms of hierarchies. People tend to overestimate the uniqueness of events and to overestimate the degrees to which their own actions influenced events. Thus, if we believe we introduced the innovation, we see it as important and original. However, if we believe our competitors introduced the innovation, we see it as less original than they claim and its apparent success is due to luck. As a result, we delay making a response, we wait for more evidence, and our formal reports likely misrepresent the evidence. When the innovation has undeniable effects and we have to respond, we underestimate our organization's capabilities.
Because organizations rely on standardized routines, they find it very difficult to behave in new ways until after they have explicitly unlearned their old ways. Knowledge is locked in by routines, careers, hierarchical statuses. One result is that major behavioural changes require wholesale changes in top management.
There are two ways organisations have coped effectively with radical innovation. One way is for top managers to make frequent reassessments of recent experience – to learn. However, long time lags and organizational politics usually interfere with such learning, and most top managers either show little ability to think creatively or have weak incentives to do so. The second way is for all firms in several related industries to conform to a "technological roadmap" that specifies a normal rate of technological improvement. This agreed rate of change has to be slow enough that the best firms can attain it consistently but also fast enough that only the best firms can attain it. Such an agreement has been sustained for almost 45 years in the microelectronics, computers, and software industries.








